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Abstract: 
 
Genetic information is relevant not only to the patient, but also to their family. Where 
a patient refuses to share that information with family members, then their legal rights 
may conflict. This paper focuses on that conflict between the rights of individuals and 
the rights of third parties. We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it 
applies in these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately 
accommodate the familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the 
situations in which a health care practitioner might owe a third party family member a 
tortious duty of care.  We conclude that in most cases, there will be no duty owed to 
third parties, but that in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise.  
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Introduction 
 
Medical confidentiality in the context of genetics raises interesting tensions because the 
information in question is not only relevant to an individual patient, but also to family 
members. The information is more relevant to relatives closer in degree, and the chance 
of it being relevant reduces the further away in the family tree the relative is from the 
original patient. It is possible that the interests of the patient and the family member 
may conflict – such as where a patient does not wish to share genetic information with 
a family member, but where that information might allow that family member to obtain 
a diagnosis and take action to avoid a negative outcome. Such a situation raises 
important and interesting legal questions, which have been reinvigorated by recent case 
law.1  
 
 
In ABC v St George’s,2 the claimant argued that a healthcare practitioner (‘HCP’) who 
had failed to disclose genetic information to a family member was liable to that family 
member in negligence.  The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the High Court, 
which had struck out the claim as having no reasonable cause of action at a preliminary 
hearing before trial.3   The claim may now be tried, and it will be for the lower court to 
determine if a HCP has a legal duty to disclose genetic information to any family 
member of their patient. It is our contention that a blunt exclusion of any duty in all 
circumstances pushes the balance of rights too far in the direction of the maintenance 
                                                 
1 ABC v St George’s [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB); Smith v University Hospitals of Leicester NHS 
Trust [2016] EWHC 817 (QB). 
2  [2017] EWCA Civ 336. 
3 (2015) 145 BMLR 154, [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB). 
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of confidentiality. As a result of this approach, a HCP would be well advised to maintain 
confidentiality in all circumstances, notwithstanding ethical arguments in favour of 
disclosure, as they will never be liable for failure to disclose to a third party, but could 
be liable for breach of confidence. This in our view is problematic  
 
In this paper we focus on the conflicts between the rights of individuals and the rights 
of third parties.4 We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it applies in 
these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately accommodate the 
familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the situations in which a HCP 
might owe a third party family member a tortious duty of care.  We conclude that in 
most cases, there will be no duty owed to third parties, but that in certain limited 
circumstances, a duty of care should arise. We argue that controls on liability can better 
be imposed by consideration of breach, rather than by imposing a blanket exclusion of 
all duties of care. 
 
This is a paper focused primarily on the law of confidence and duty of care to third 
parties in genetics, more than ethical and professional obligations. Although the 
bioethics literature informs the law in important respects, and is relevant to our analysis, 
our discussions are mainly focused on the legal position, rather than the moral or ethical 
argumentation. Moreover, we integrate an exploration of the duty of confidence and the 
                                                 
4 We limit our consideration in this paper to the rights and duties arising in the clinical context, 
and therefore do not consider the duties which might arise where a participant takes part in 
research, or where non-clinical genetic testing is undertaken (such as direct-to-consumer testing 
for interest or ancestry testing). It is worth noting however that the clear distinctions which may 
in the past have been possible between research and clinical testing may be increasingly blurred, 
especially in the field of ‘precision medicine’. These questions are discussed in C Mitchell et 
al, ‘Exploring the potential duty of care in clinical genomics under UK law’ (2017) Medical 
Law International (in press). 
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law of tort as it applies in this field, in the light of recent scientific and case law 
developments. 
Genetic information and the family 
 
As has been extensively rehearsed elsewhere,5 unlike many other types of information, 
genetic information is not only relevant to the individual patient, but also to family 
members. There are many diseases which have some genetic component. Heart disease 
and cancer ‘run in families’, and can arise from different genetic and environmental 
causes.6  However, the types of diseases with which this paper is concerned have a 
much stronger and more clearly defined genetic basis.  
 
Single gene disorders involve mutations in a single gene that lead to a disease state, for 
example Huntington’s disease or cystic fibrosis (CF).7 Most single gene disorders are 
rare.8 An autosomal dominant disorder is a genetic disease which will manifest itself 
                                                 
5 See for example SM Liao, ‘Is There a Duty to Share Genetic Information?’ (2009) 35 Journal 
of Medical Ethics 306; M Parker and AM Lucassen, ‘Genetic Information: A Joint Account?’ 
(2004) 329 British Medical Journal 165; Graeme T Laurie, ‘Obligations Arising from Genetic 
Information – Negligence and the Protection of Familial Interests’ (1999) 11 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 97; Bartha Maria Knoppers, ‘Genetic Information and the Family: Are We Our 
Brother’s Keeper?’ (2002) 20 Trends in Biotechnology 85. 
6 HV Firth, JA Hurst and JG Hall, Oxford Desk Reference: Clinical Genetics (Oxford Desk 
Reference Series, OUP, Oxford 2005) 24. 
7 A catalogue of all known single-gene disorders was compiled in 1966 by Victor McKusick, 
and an up to date version is now accessible online as Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man: V 
McKusick, 'Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man (OMIM)' http://www.omim.org/ accessed 18 
October 2016. 
8  Single gene disorder range from relatively common genetic disorders such as CF with an 
incidence of about 1 in 2400 live births in the UK population: JA Dodge and others, 'Cystic 
Fibrosis Mortality and Survival in the UK: 1947-2003' (2007) 29 Eur Respiratory J 522, to 
extremely rare disorders which might have an incidence of perhaps 1 or even fewer in all births 
in a year in the UK 
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if an individual possesses at least one affected copy of the relevant gene, with a 50 
percent risk that offspring will inherit the mutation from the affected parent. Many 
autosomal dominant disorders either have a delayed age of onset or exhibit reduced 
penetrance, that is, there is not a 100 percent chance that the person will exhibit 
symptoms of the disease in question.9 An autosomal recessive disorder is a disorder 
which requires two affected copies of the gene to manifest clinically. When an 
individual concerned possesses only one of two affected copies of the gene, they are a 
carrier, and they do not manifest the disease, or will have very mild symptoms in 
comparison with the disease state.10 An X-linked disorder is one which is inherited via 
the X chromosome, and may be either dominant or recessive. An X-linked dominant 
disorder manifests very severely in males, and often leads to spontaneous loss of an 
affected pregnancy or neonatal death; females have less severe features than males. An 
X-linked recessive disorder is encoded on the X chromosome such that a female who 
possesses one normal copy and one affected copy of the gene will not manifest the 
disease (although may have some minor features of the condition), but a male,11 if he 
inherits the affected copy of the gene, will manifest the disease.12 
 
This classification of diseases is something of an oversimplification. Not all disease 
genes are fully penetrant, and there may be variable severity in how a disease manifests 
in different individuals who all carry the same mutation, even within families. 
                                                 
9 HV Firth, JA Hurst and JG Hall, Oxford Desk Reference: Clinical Genetics (Oxford Desk 
Reference Series, OUP, Oxford 2005) 6. 
10 HV Firth, JA Hurst and JG Hall, Oxford Desk Reference: Clinical Genetics (Oxford Desk 
Reference Series, OUP, Oxford 2005) 8. 
11 Males possess only one X chromosome. 
12 R Twyman, 'The Wellcome Trust, The Human Genome, X-linked Diseases' 
<http://genome.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_wtd020851.html> accessed 23 September 2009. 
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Moreover, later onset diseases may have an earlier or later age of onset, and there are 
myriad genetic and environmental factors which influence disease course. Genetic 
inheritance is complex, and research continues in an attempt to further elucidate disease 
inheritance mechanisms.13 
 
As may be evident from this short recital of genetic disease mechanisms, while the 
genetic information of an individual diagnosed with a genetic disease (the proband) 
may also be relevant to members of his or her family, the extent to which that 
information is relevant will vary depending on factors such as the closeness of the 
relationship (eg first degree relatives vs more distant relationships) as well as the nature 
of the disease (dominant vs recessive, penetrance, likelihood of spontaneous mutation 
causing the disease). It is therefore an oversimplification to contend that all genetic 
information is equally relevant to all the family of the proband – there is a degree of 
nuance. However, what is clear is that where a proband has been diagnosed with a 
genetic disease, then members of his or her family may have an increased risk of 
themselves having that genetic mutation and therefore the disease.  HCPs working in 
the field of clinical genetics are therefore very concerned to disseminate the information 
through the family. 
 
In many cases, where family relationships are reasonably cordial, there is no conflict 
between any duty to warn third parties and the duty of confidentiality, where the patient 
is prepared to disclose information, or gives permission for a HCP to disclose 
                                                 
13 See for example the research into genetic variation arising from the ExAC project: 
http://exac.broadinstitute.org/, discussed in Erika Check Hayden, ‘A Radical Revision of 
Human Genetics’ (2016) 538 Nature 154. 
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information to family members.14 Where however a patient refuses permission to 
disclose, as in the case of ABC,15 then a conflict between the duty of confidentiality, 
and any potential duty to third parties may arise. Although such cases may be relatively 
rare in practice, perhaps partly due to the care with which genetics professionals manage 
family communications,16 they nonetheless present an interesting legal question which 
demonstrates the need for the law to develop in a flexible and appropriate manner to 
accommodate emerging medical technologies. Moreover, as genomic medicine 
becomes integrated into mainstream clinical practice, it seems likely that the number of 
these cases will increase. 
Recent case law  
 
Two recent cases have provided the first English cases which are relevant to the 
question of confidentiality and the duty to warn in the context of genetic testing.   In 
both, the claim was brought by a relative of the proband who had suffered damage as a 
                                                 
14 We acknowledge that cases of passive non-disclosure exist, where a patient undertakes to 
disclose to family members, and then does not. There are many and varied reasons and patterns 
of this non-disclosure. (For an examination of the complexities of this area see Arribas-Ayllon, 
M., Featherstone, K. & Atkinson, P. “The practical ethics of genetic responsibility: Non-
disclosure and the autonomy of affect” (2011) 9  Soc Theory Health 3) However, for the 
purposes of this paper, we focus on the situation where a HCP is aware of a patient’s intention 
not to disclose, in order to clearly examine the relevant legal principles. It may be worth noting 
however that a HCP who acts reasonably and who is unaware of a failure to disclose is unlikely 
to be liable in tort, and is similarly unlikely to choose to seek to disclose to a third party in spite 
of the duty of confidence. 
15 [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB); 
16 Angus Clarke and others, ‘Genetic Professionals’ Reports of Nondisclosure of Genetic Risk 
Information within Families.’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Human Genetics 556. It may be 
worth noting that, while known cases of refusal to disclose may be rare, HCPs worry that they 
do not know for certain whether a patient’s expressed intention to disclose information to family 
members results in appropriate disclosure: Sandi Dheensa, Angela Fenwick and Anneke 
Lucassen, ‘Approaching confidentiality at a familial level in genomic medicine: a focus group 
study with healthcare professionals’ (2017) BMJ Open 7:e012443. 
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result of the failure of the treating HCP to inform of the possibility of inheritance of a 
specific genetic condition.   
 
ABC v St George’s 
ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust,17 involved unusual facts: in 2007, the 
claimant’s father killed the claimant’s mother.  He was convicted of manslaughter on 
the grounds of diminished responsibility and detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983.18  In 2009, he was diagnosed with Huntington’s disease.  At the time, the 
claimant, who was pregnant, was attending family therapy sessions, with her father and 
therapists from the first defendant, St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust. Sessions took 
place both before and after the father’s diagnosis was confirmed. 
 
The father did not want his daughters to be informed of his diagnosis: he was concerned 
that they “might get upset, kill themselves or have an abortion”.19 Following discussion, 
the medical staff decided to respect his confidentiality: the claimant was not informed 
and her pregnancy continued.  In 2013, the claimant tested positive for the Huntington’s 
Disease gene.20 
 
A claim was brought in negligence: it was argued that the defendants owed a duty to 
warn the claimant and that, by failing to disclose her father’s diagnosis, the defendant 
                                                 
17 [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB). 
18 Under ss. 37 and 41 of the 1983 Act. 
19 [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB), [5]. 
20 It was not known at the time of the hearing whether her daughter had inherited the gene, as 
predictive testing for adult onset conditions is generally not carried out in children: Jeffrey R 
Botkin and others, ‘Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Implications of 
Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents’ (2015) 97 The American Journal of Human 
Genetics 6. 
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had been in breach of that duty.  The breach had caused damage, in that the claimant 
was denied the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy.21  The defendants applied to 
have the claim struck out, as having no reasonable cause of action. In the High Court,  
Nicol J found that it would not be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to find that the defendants 
owed the claimant a duty of care;22 and that the duty claimed would involve a ‘giant 
step’,23 contrary to the incremental approach24 emphasised in Michael v Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police.25 Accordingly, the application succeeded. 
 
The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal:26 Irwin LJ, giving the only judgment, applied 
the Caparo27 test of proximity, foreseeability and whether it would be ‘fair, just and 
reasonable’ to impose a duty of care.  Assuming, for the purposes of the application, 
that the elements of proximity and foreseeability had been made out, he considered the 
nine reasons that the defendant had set out that it would not be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ 
to impose a duty to disclose confidential genetic information.   
 
The reasons included that the interest of the third party in receiving the information was 
a private interest that could not prevail over the public interest in maintaining 
                                                 
21 The court was prepared to accept, for the purposes of the application, that such a claim could 
have succeeded, had the defendant owed a duty of case.  However, the claimant would have 
faced significant barriers, including establishing that the defendant’s breach had caused 
actionable harm: see Victoria Chico ‘Non-disclosure of genetic risks: The case for developing 
legal wrongs’ (2016) 16(1-2) Medical Law International 3–26. 
22 At [31]. 
23 At [27]. 
24 At [102]: “The development of the law of negligence has been by an incremental process 
rather than giant steps.” (Lord Toulson, with whom Lords Neuberger, Mance, Reed and Hodge 
agreed). 
25 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732. 
26 [2017] EWCA Civ 336. 
27 Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
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confidentiality; that it would encourage HCPs to disclose when not justified; that the 
HCP would be subject to conflicting duties of confidentiality to the patient and 
disclosure to the third party;  that it would undermine trust in HCPs and discourage 
patients from disclosing information; that it would cause HCPs to put undue pressure 
on patients to consent to disclosure; that it might be damaging to the third party’s mental 
health to receive the information; and that it would place an additional burden on HCPs 
which would distract them from their role in treating patients. 
 
The court noted that an HCP in possession of genetic information which affected a third 
party would, in some circumstances, be under an existing professional, as opposed to 
legal, obligation to disclose. The conflict between the duty of confidence to the patient 
and a professional obligation to prevent harm to others already existed and it was not 
established that to make the professional obligation legally binding would cause the 
problems claimed.  Accordingly, none of the policy considerations was sufficiently 
powerful to justify allowing the claim to be struck out before trial.28    Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court had held, in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Authority,29  that, in the 
case of informed consent, it was necessary to impose legal obligations to reinforce 
professional obligations, in order that HCPs would meet those obligations. 
 
The Court of Appeal also considered the American cases of Tarasoff30 and Safer v 
Pack,31although it did not expressly endorse the cases.32  In both of these cases, it had 
                                                 
28 See [26], [31], [34], [40-41] of the judgment. 
29 [2015] AC 1430, [2015] UKSC 11 2014, [93] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reed). 
30 Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California (1976) 551 P.2d 334. 
31 (1996) 291 N.J.Sup. 619, 677 A. 2d 1188. 
32 ABC (n 17) at [60]. 
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been held that a HCP was, in some circumstances, under a duty to disclose confidential 
information to a third party.   Of particular relevance was Safer: in this case, the plaintiff 
was the daughter of one of the defendant’s patients, who had died of colo-rectal cancer 
in the 1950s.  The plaintiff later suffered from the same condition, and claimed against 
the doctor for failing to warn her of her own risk of developing the disease.  The 
Superior Court of New Jersey held that they saw ‘no impediment, legal or otherwise, 
to recognising a physician’s duty to warn those known to be at risk of avoidable harm 
from a genetically transmissible condition’.33   
Smith v University of Leicester NHS Trust 
 
Following the successful strike out application in the High Court of ABC, a further 
claim in respect of a genetic disorder was brought in Smith v University of Leicester 
NHS Trust.34  In this case, there was a failure to diagnose adrenomyeloneuropathy, a 
genetic disorder: the HCP ordered diagnostic tests but they were not carried out.  As a 
result, the patient was not diagnosed until one of the claimants (his second cousin) was 
himself diagnosed with the childhood variant of the condition, adrenoleukodystrophy.  
The claim was against the HCP who failed to diagnose the condition at the earliest 
opportunity: had the earlier diagnosis been made, the claimants could have been tested 
at an earlier stage and taken steps to ameliorate their condition.  As in ABC, the strike 
out application was granted: the court held that it would not be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ 
to impose a duty on a HCP in relation to a third party who was not a patient.   
 
                                                 
33 Safer (n 31) 1192. 
34 [2016] EWHC 817 (QB). 
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In this case, the reason that the relative was not informed was that the HCP had failed 
to diagnose the patient, rather than that the HCP was respecting the patient’s refusal to 
consent to disclosure of his genetic information.   
 
 
Competing duties? 
 
The nature of the English adversarial system is that cases tend to focus on either the 
question of the duty of confidence or the duty to warn. However, in the case of 
disclosure of genetic information to relatives against the wishes of the proband, the two 
duties are directly competing. We therefore examine the law relating to the duty of 
confidence, before considering the potential scope of the tortious duty to warn. 
Duty of confidence 
 
That a duty of confidence exists in relation to medical information is axiomatic. The 
traditional formulation of an equitable duty of confidence, with its three elements is: 
the information is of a private, personal or intimate nature; it is imparted in 
circumstances imposing an obligation of confidence; and it has been disclosed without 
authorisation.35 
 
                                                 
35 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd (1969) RPC 41 at 47, Tanya Aplin and others, Gurry on 
Breach of Confidence (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) [1.02]. 
13 
 
Case law since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has reformulated 
the cause of action in terms of private rather than confidential information,36 and the 
question is whether there is a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’.37 It is doubtful 
whether the reformulation of the test in light of the HRA has made any material 
difference in relation to the law applicable to medical information. Genetic information 
(at least insofar as it has medical implications) is private,38 and there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to genetic information obtained or imparted in the 
medical context. The respect for the medical duty of confidentiality is well encapsulated 
by Lord Philips MR in Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd, who stated ‘It is well 
settled that there is an abiding obligation of confidentiality as between doctor and 
patient, and in my view when a patient enters a hospital for treatment, whether he be a 
model citizen or murderer, he is entitled to be confident that details about his condition 
and treatment remain between himself and those who treat him.’39 The case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights has equally upheld the importance of confidentiality 
of medical information under Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). Respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal 
systems of all the contracting parties to the ECHR.40  
                                                 
36 A v B plc [2003] QB 195; Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL). 
37 See for example Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL) per Lord 
Nicholls and Baroness Hale; Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 (CA) 161; McKennitt v 
Ash [2008] QB 73 (CA) 82 and 86; Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA 
Civ 808 (CA) [22] and [39]. 
38 Although compare the refusal to recognise forensic genetic information as personal and 
private by the House of Lords in R. (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire; R. (on the application of Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] 
UKHL 39; cf the European Court of Human Rights in S v United Kingdom (30562/04);Marper 
v United Kingdom (30566/04) (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 50. 
39 [2000] 1 WLR 515, 527 (Lord Philips MR, citing Rougier J’s High Court judgment in the 
case). 
40 Z v Finland (22009/93) (1998) 25 EHRR 371; I v Finland (2009) 48 EHRR 31; Ashworth 
Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [200] UKHL 29; McKennitt v Ash [2008] 2008] QB 73; Tanya 
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Whilst the existence of the duty in a medical context is relatively uncontroversial, the 
flexibility of the test arises in relation to the question of breach. In such a case, a party 
needs to avail themselves of a legitimating reason for disclosure, typically either 
consent or the public interest.41 
 
In the context of disclosure of genetic information, consent is undoubtedly the most 
practical legitimation of disclosure and those working in clinical genetics work hard to 
gain consent to disclosure.42 This may be facilitated through explanations and 
counselling prior to testing of the proband, and the use of follow up counselling. 
Clinical genetics professionals may also attempt to circumvent strained family 
relationships through offers to convene meetings, provision of appropriate letters for 
the proband to distribute to family or offers to communicate with other HCPs (including 
GPs) where this might help facilitate disclosure.43 Despite the complications in practice, 
as a matter of law however, the question of consent is largely uncontroversial – consent 
will either be present or absent, and will be a question of fact in a particular case.44 
                                                 
Aplin and others, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012). 
[6.122] 
41 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359 
42 Consent in genetics is a highly controversial area, and the subject of extensive literature. For 
the purposes of our argument however, we do not delve into these issues, which have been 
explored in depth by others. Instead, we note that courts regularly address the question of 
whether consent is present as a matter of fact, and where necessary would be entirely capable 
to making such findings of fact in relation to the duty of confidence. 
43 Michael Parker, Ethical Problems in Genetics Practice (Cambridge University Press 2012); 
Sandi Dheensa, Angela Fenwick and Anneke Lucassen, ‘Approaching confidentiality at a 
familial level in genomic medicine: a focus group study with healthcare professionals’ (2017) 
BMJ Open 7:e012443. 
44 For examples of determination of whether consent is present as a question of fact, see for 
example Al Hamwi v Johnson [2005] EWHC 206; Lybert v. Warrington Health Authority 
[1996] PIQR 45. 
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In contrast however, the question of disclosure in the public interest is more complex. 
The equitable duty of confidence is traditionally seen as a balancing of two competing 
public interests – the public interest in the maintenance of confidence on the one hand, 
and the public interest in disclosure on the other.45 Similarly, an Art 8 analysis requires 
the balancing of competing interests to determine whether disclosure is in the public 
interest.46 The cases on disclosure in the public interest in medical law can be 
characterised as falling into three broad categories: prevention of harm to others, 
prevention or detection of crime, and teaching, research or audit.47 It is only the first of 
these categories which will be of relevance to a HCP wishing to disclose genetic 
information to a third party member of the family of the proband. 
 
The paradigm English case about disclosure in the public interest is W v Egdell.48  The 
plaintiff, who was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, shot and killed five people 
and injured two others in 1974. His plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter was 
accepted, and he was detained in a psychiatric hospital. In support of his application for 
a transfer to a regional secure unit some twelve years later, the plaintiff sought a report 
from the defendant as an independent consultant psychiatrist. The defendant's report 
did not support the plaintiff's application; it disclosed that the plaintiff had a long 
standing and continuing interest in homemade bombs, and did not accept the view that 
the plaintiff was no longer a danger to the public. The plaintiff withdrew his application 
                                                 
45 W v Egdell [1990] 1 Ch 359 at 415. 
46 Z v Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371; Stone v South East Coast Strategic Health Authority [2006] 
EWHC 1668 (Admin) at [26]. 
47 Emily Jackson, Medical Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013). 
48  [1990] 1 All ER 835. 
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to the tribunal and refused to consent to the defendant disclosing the report to the 
medical officer at the secure hospital. However, the defendant disclosed the report 
without consent to the medical officer of the psychiatric hospital. On discovering the 
disclosure, the plaintiff sued for breach of confidence. It was held that whilst a duty of 
confidence was owed, and that maintenance of the duty of confidence was a matter of 
public interest, the public interest in maintaining the confidence (so that patients can 
trust their HCPs) must be balanced against the public interest in favour of disclosure (to 
the protect the public). Disclosure was justified in this case. The court held that what 
was required to justify disclosure in the public interest was a real, and not merely 
theoretical, risk of imminent and serious harm.  
 
Other cases on disclosure in the public interest are few. Virtually all other cases have 
been about the disclosure of private information in the press, and the focus has rather 
been on the balancing of the public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality or 
privacy against public interest in disclosure pursuant to the Art 10 right to freedom of 
expression.49 In Stone50, the court considered the application of Art 8 to the question of 
whether it was in the public interest to disclose the private medical information about a 
convicted murderer in the context of a report into the failures of the system of 
psychiatric and social care. The court held that the balance was in favour of disclosure, 
and was particularly influenced by the fact that the publicity and need for the report 
arose out of the criminal acts of Mr Stone. This conclusion was reached solely in 
relation to Art 8, and was bolstered by reference to Art 10. Other cases which balance 
                                                 
49 Such as for example Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL); 
Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 (CA) 161; Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2011] EWCA Civ 808; PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26. 
50 Stone v South East Coast Strategic Health Authority [2006] EWHC 1668 (Admin). 
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the Art 8 rights of individuals against the public interest draw more heavily on the 
public interest aspects of the Art 10 right to freedom of speech.51 Such Art 10 rights are 
unlikely to be engaged in the question of disclosure of genetic information to family 
members of the proband, so the case law provides little assistance. 
Balancing – relevant considerations 
 
The application of the law in this field to the disclosure of genetic information is 
complex. Egdell was a case where the requirements were all clearly satisfied on their 
facts – there was a real risk of serious physical harm, with a clear degree of imminence. 
Difficulties arise in the way in which the test can be applied in the genetic context 
however, in all three aspects of risk, imminence and seriousness. Each of these 
considerations will need to be viewed in a more nuanced manner than in the typical 
scenarios in cases such as Egdell, where there was an imminent risk of serious criminal 
harm from a psychiatric patient. 
 
The courts have traditionally viewed the duty of confidence as important and have been 
slow to find a public interest in disclosure in the absence of serious physical harm, or 
an Art 10 interest. It therefore seems plausible that for a disease which has an adult 
onset, with variable penetrance (such as for example BRCA breast cancer) that the 
traditional requirements would not be satisfied. This may sit uneasily with many 
clinicians, and potentially with the General Medical Council guidance on the duty of 
confidence.52  
                                                 
51 See for example Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. 
52 General Medical Council Confidentiality (2009). 
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In light of Art 8 considerations, a more flexible view can and should be taken. In Stone, 
the court spoke of the need to examine the facts and circumstances of each case, and to 
adopt a “close and penetrating examination”.53 Accordingly, a balance must be struck 
between the Art 8 rights of the proband, as against the Art 8 rights of the family 
members. 
 
Risk 
The court in Egdell spoke of a real, rather than merely theoretical, risk. In that case, the 
risk was seen to be real, although the person likely to manifest the risk was still in a 
secure unit, and unlikely to be released into the community for some time, and only 
after satisfying a number of other conditions set by various tribunals. The risk posed by 
genetic mutations should satisfy this criterion in many cases. There are two different 
ways that risk can be variable in genetics. First, as the familial closeness to the proband 
decreases, the risk decreases. For example, where a great-grandchild of a person with a 
neurodegenerative disease is concerned, there is a 12.5% risk of them carrying the 
mutation.54 Secondly, for diseases with variable penetrance, the risk of developing the 
disease may be lower. For example, some diseases have a high correlation between 
carrying a mutation and experiencing the disease. In other cases, other factors may 
influence whether the disease manifests, or whether it is serious or more minor, or the 
age of onset. All these factors may be taken into account by a court when considering 
the risk to others. 
                                                 
53 Stone v South East Coast Strategic Health Authority [2006] EWHC 1668 (Admin) at [34]. 
54 Zornitza Stark and others, ‘Predictive Genetic Testing for Neurodegenerative Conditions: 
How Should Conflicting Interests within Families Be Managed?’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 640. 
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Imminence   
In Egdell, the court attached some significance to the imminence of the harm in question 
– the potential release from a secure hospital, and ultimately into the community. 
Genetic diseases are rarely imminent, in the sense that harm will arise within hours or 
days. Many genetic diseases may be late onset, and the harm may arise many years into 
the future. However, medical interventions or screening may be possible at an early 
stage, and lifestyle changes can begin very early. In this sense, whilst the ultimate 
serious harm may not be immediate, some efforts to avert that harm may be imminently 
possible. 
 
Serious harm  
The question of whether harm is serious in the genetic context is also complex. Some 
cases may be clear, for example where the consequences of the disease are serious and 
there is an intervention possible. An instructive example is the case of a sudden cardiac 
death mutation where a defibrillator may be implanted, and/or medication may prevent 
sudden death, or the option exists to have increased screening or monitoring for early 
symptoms of the conditions (e.g. in Lynch syndrome which predisposes to various 
cancers). However, other genetic diseases, such as Huntington’s disease are serious but 
have no (yet) known interventions. However, genetic medicine advances rapidly, and 
new treatments arise. To avoid disclosure now on the basis that there is no currently 
known treatment makes a decision frozen in time. Unless there is a means to regularly 
revisit decisions made on this basis, then there is a chance that someone is deprived of 
a chance to obtain treatment in the future, on the basis that their risk of inheriting the 
condition is not made known to them. 
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Even where there is no means to prevent a serious outcome such as death, there may be 
other steps which an individual might wish to take if they know about their risk. The 
opportunity to make reproductive choices is an obvious matter – including undertaking 
invasive testing of a pregnancy or seeking preimplantation genetic diagnosis to avoid 
passing on a familial condition. Other options include changing life choices, such as 
avoiding particular careers or doing things at a younger age to avoid missing out on 
opportunities if predisposed to a late onset condition.  
 
In addition, harm could be constituted by the failure to know about carrier status, and 
thus passing on a genetic condition to a child. Would the balance be in favour of 
disclosure to relatives who could only be carriers, rather than having the condition 
themselves? Those individuals will not have serious health consequences themselves, 
but they would be able to use the information to make informed reproductive choices.  
 
Arguably, the flexibilities inherent in the human rights (or indeed equitable) approach 
enable the court to take a more expansive view of harm. Accordingly, these types of 
harm which might be more problematic for a tort claim could be sufficient to justify 
disclosure in the public interest. 
 
Balancing of competing rights: 
 
The balance in the case of disclosure to family members, in contrast to most of the cases 
in this field, is not between competing Art 8 and Art 10 rights, but rather competing Art 
8 rights. The right in question is of one individual keeping medical information 
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confidential, as against the right of another person to have access to information which 
is important for their private and family life. The courts will balance these rights taking 
into account all the circumstances, and cannot prioritise one person’s convention right 
over another. Such balancing will necessarily be highly dependent on the facts of the 
case, and courts are ideally placed to weigh the relevant and competing factors, in 
conducting an ‘ultimate’ balancing exercise applying the proportionality test to the 
rights of each party.55 
 
Ethical duty vs legal duty? 
 
Whether HCPs have an ethical duty to disclose information to family members is the 
subject of extensive commentary and discussion in the bioethics literature. The 
dominant model is known as the joint account model, and was proposed by Parker and 
Lucassen in a paper in the British Medical Journal in 2004.56 In that paper, Parker and 
Lucassen argue that as genetic information is shared by more than one individual (like 
information about a joint bank account), the ethical problem faced by a clinician is not 
whether to respect confidentiality, but instead, ‘what, if anything, would justify 
excluding others from the joint account’. They suggest that, on the joint account model, 
it is assumed that information should be made available to all account holders unless 
there are good reasons to do otherwise. 
 
                                                 
55 In re S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47 [2005] 1 AC 593 at [17]. 
56 M Parker and AM Lucassen, ‘Genetic Information: A Joint Account?’ (2004) 329 British 
Medical Journal 165 at 166. 
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Since publication, the joint account model has been widely cited, and has been broadly 
adopted in bioethics literature.57 It has informed the guidelines from the Joint 
Committee on Medical Genetics about consent and confidentiality to the extent that the 
guidelines recommend a record of discussion form for genetic testing which includes a 
statement that “I acknowledge that my results will sometimes be used to inform the 
appropriate healthcare of family members” rather than asking for agreement to 
sharing.58  
 
The joint account model draws on a model of autonomy that is relational in nature. In 
contrast to more traditional conceptions of autonomy which underpin the focus on the 
individual in biomedical ethics, relational autonomy is increasingly being adopted as 
the basis of bioethical approaches, particularly with respect to the ethical, legal and 
social implications of genetics and genomics. A relational approach enables a more 
nuanced approach to ethical questions, with a focus on the development of individual 
autonomy through social embededness and relationships with others.59  Such an 
approach seems intuitively more attractive for questions about genetics, where 
                                                 
57 See for example Sandi Dheensa, Angela Fenwick and Anneke Lucassen, ‘“Is This 
Knowledge Mine and Nobody Else’s? I Don’t Feel That.” Patient Views about Consent, 
Confidentiality and Information-Sharing in Genetic Medicine’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 174; Sandi Dheensa and others, ‘Health-Care Professionals’ Responsibility to Patients’ 
Relatives in Genetic Medicine: A Systematic Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research.’ 
(2016) 18 Genetics in Medicine 290; Béatrice Godard and others, ‘Guidelines for Disclosing 
Genetic Information to Family Members: From Development to Use’ (2006) 5 Familial Cancer 
103; Angela Davey, Ainsley Newson and Peter O’Leary, ‘Communication of Genetic 
Information within Families: The Case for Familial Comity’ (2006) 3 Journal of Bioethical 
Inquiry 161. 
58 Sandi Dheensa, Angela Fenwick and Anneke Lucassen, ‘“Is This Knowledge Mine and 
Nobody Else’s? I Don’t Feel That.” Patient Views about Consent, Confidentiality and 
Information-Sharing in Genetic Medicine’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical Ethics 174. 
59 A detailed discussion of relational autonomy is beyond the scope of this paper. For a 
considerations of the applicability of relational models of autonomy in genetics see, inter alia, 
Heather Widdows. ‘Between the individual and the community: the impact of genetics on 
ethical models’ (2009) 28 New Genetics and Society 173. 
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relatedness, and relationships, are at the very core of the subject matter that gives rise 
to the ethical questions. 
 
The extent to which the law of confidence can accommodate a strongly relational 
autonomy approach is unclear. As Foster and colleagues acknowledge, courts are 
unlikely to ‘take on a completely relational approach to the law’.60 It seems that the 
most appropriate means to do so is to incorporate considerations as to relatedness into 
questions of disclosure in the public interest. A wider conception of the public interest, 
which takes account of the relational nature of the information in question seems 
possible, and appropriate. Indeed, when balancing the public interest in press 
publication privacy cases, questions of the rights of children and other family members 
are balanced by the courts in weighing the public interest in maintence of confidentiality 
vs freedom of expression.61 An approach to autonomy which considers the individual 
as embeded within their social context and family relationships can be accommodated 
in this way.  
 
What seems less workable is a broad adoption of the ethical joint account model as a 
legal model which sees the information in question as ‘belonging’ to all family 
members jointly. First, it is not clear who the information would be ‘owned’ by. As 
noted above, information has diminishing relevance to family members the further 
away from the proband they are in relatedness. However, there is still a chance that the 
information is relevant. As Liao notes, different types of genetic information will have 
                                                 
60 Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring and Magnus Boyd, ‘Testing the Limits of the “Joint 
Account” Model of Genetic Information: A Legal Thought Experiment.’ (2015) 41 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 379 at 381. 
61 PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26. 
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stronger reasons to be shared with some family members than others, due to the nature 
of disease inheritance.62 It seems unlikely that a broad conception of joint ‘ownership’ 
of genetic information would be in accordance with Art 8 obligations. Finally, treating 
genetic information in this exceptional manner seems unwarranted, as other health 
information (such as cholesterol levels) is private to the individual, whilst nonetheless 
having some relevance for family members.63 
 
Interestingly, in research carried out into patient views on the sharing of genetic 
information with family members without consent, the patient views arguably aligned 
more with the law of confidence than the joint account model.64 Dheensa and colleagues 
found that the patients they studied found it generally acceptable that a HCP share 
information with family members without consent and that while they considered that 
this would indeed be a breach of confidence, that the ‘harm was trivial compared with 
the benefit of knowing about the risk’. In our view, this approach broadly accords with 
the authorisation of disclosure of confidential information in the public interest, with 
the justification framed in terms of preventing illness that could lead to avoidable 
harm.65  
 
                                                 
62 SM Liao, ‘Is There a Duty to Share Genetic Information?’ (2009) 35 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 306. 
63 Although some HCPs would argue that information about cholesterol levels, at least when 
high enough to suggest a familial component, is information which should also be shared with 
family members, akin to genetic information. 
64 Sandi Dheensa, Angela Fenwick and Anneke Lucassen, ‘“Is This Knowledge Mine and 
Nobody Else’s? I Don’t Feel That.” Patient Views about Consent, Confidentiality and 
Information-Sharing in Genetic Medicine’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical Ethics 174. 
65 Sandi Dheensa, Angela Fenwick and Anneke Lucassen, ‘“Is This Knowledge Mine and 
Nobody Else’s? I Don’t Feel That.” Patient Views about Consent, Confidentiality and 
Information-Sharing in Genetic Medicine’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical Ethics 174.  
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The joint account model serves a useful purpose to facilitate discussion as to the nature 
of genetic information and the way in which it is practically treated in the clinical 
genetics context. To the extent that the joint account model reflects the true practice of 
clinical genetics (the ‘law in practice’) then it is essential that regard is paid to the 
congruence between it and the law. The joint account model usefully highlights the 
potential difficulties that can arise where there is familial conflict, and proposes an 
ethical approach to confidentiality and genetic information. It is not however a true 
reflection of the legal approach to genetic information and confidentiality, and to apply 
the joint account model as a justification for disclosure without regard to the legal duty 
of confidence would be potentially problematic and could lead to liability for breach of 
confidence. 
 
Where there is no refusal to communicate, then both the legal approach and the joint 
account model are consistent – whether there is consent to disclosure and therefore no 
breach in the traditional model, or the information is part of the joint account – HCP, 
proband and third party will be satisfied as to their legal rights and responsibilities. The 
difficulties (as in all areas of law) arise at the margins, where conflict arises. In the type 
of case which concerns us in this paper, where the proband refuses either to consent to 
disclosure or to pass on the relevant information to third parties, the law and the joint 
account model seem likely to result in different outcomes.  
The duty to family members 
 
The duty of confidentiality is a duty owed to the proband. Those family members who 
may share genes with the proband are third parties: external to the confidential 
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relationship.   It is, as considered above, permissible in some circumstances to disclose 
information to third parties.  However, no duty to a third party can arise under a duty 
of confidentiality.   
 
In the absence of a confidential or contractual relationship between the HCP and the 
third party, a legal duty to disclose can only arise in tort: specifically, in negligence.  A 
claim in negligence requires that the HCP owes a duty of care to the third party: without 
such a duty, the negligence claim fails at the first hurdle.  The third party must also 
show that the HCP breached that duty by acting unreasonably,66 and that the breach 
caused the third party damage.67  Although damage, in the context of negligence, is 
usually restricted to physical injury, psychiatric injury in the form of a recognised 
mental illness, property damage and economic loss, it has also been held to include 
interference with the claimant’s right to reproductive autonomy.68  Courts have also 
allowed negligence type claims to succeed on the basis of violation of the claimant’s 
rights.69   
 
While the Court of Appeal’s judgment in ABC opens the door to there being a duty 
imposed on HCPs to inform third parties of genetic information, there is as yet no 
authority that a HCP owes a general duty of care to any third party.  However, as we 
                                                 
66 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430. 
67 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
68 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309; See 
also Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134, in which a ‘modest departure from 
classical causation principles’ (at [24]) was allowed in order to vindicate the claimant’s right to 
autonomy. 
69 Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] AC 225; DSD 
v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2015] EWCA Civ 646, [2016] QB 161; OOO v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 1246 (QB). 
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argue below, third party duties have been imposed in a number of different areas, 
including psychiatric injury,70 wrongful birth,71 failure to protect from personal injury72 
and causing economic loss.73  Our analysis of these cases concludes that both precedent 
and legal principle both support the imposition of a limited duty of care on HCPs, where 
they are aware of information that would seriously affect a third party.  The duty would 
be to take reasonable steps to ensure that third parties who bear sufficient proximity to 
the patient and who will foreseeably be seriously affected are aware of the information.  
We also consider whether, in the context of healthcare, it is necessary to use duty of 
care as a ‘control mechanism’, to keep the tort of negligence within acceptable bounds.  
We conclude that such a control mechanism is not justified in this context. 
 
The duty to warn 
 
A duty to warn is a duty to inform a claimant of information, which the defendant knew 
or should have known, which would have allowed the claimant to avoid harm.  As far 
as English courts are concerned, a failure to warn is a ‘pure omission’74 and there is no 
general duty for pure omissions in English tort law: unless there is a pre-existing duty 
of care, a person is not liable in negligence for a failure to warn.75  If applied to the 
                                                 
70 McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1992] 1 AC 310 
71 Rand v East Dorset Health Authority (2000) 56 BMLR 39. 
72 Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 255, Watson v British Boxing Board of Control [2001] 
QB 1134. 
73 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207. 
74 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241, 271 (Lord Goff). 
75 Yuen Kun Yu v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175, 192 (Lord Keith);  Mitchell 
v Glasgow City Council [2009] AC 874. [2009] UKHL 11. 
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clinical context, this would mean that a HCP is not liable for any failure to warn a non-
patient, even if the omission causes easily preventable harm to that person.  Prima facie, 
a HCP owes a duty of care to his patients, but not, under usual circumstances, to non-
patients: until the HCP accepts a patient into his care, there is no duty of care.76 
Duties in Tort to Third Parties 
 
When the case ABC77 comes to trial, the claimant, as a third party to the doctor-patient 
relationship, will have to establish that the defendants owed a duty of care to her in the 
form of a duty to warn, which was co-existent with the duty owed to the primary party, 
her father.  Co-existing duties are not unprecedented: in fact, there is no reason, either 
in legal principle or binding precedent, that such duties should not exist. 78  The 
principle that a duty to one person – in contract or tort - excludes a duty to a third party, 
if it ever was part of English law,79 was conclusively laid to rest by Donoghue v 
Stevenson.80  In that case, the contractual duty owed as a manufacturer to the buyer of 
the ginger beer did not prevent a duty of care being owed to the consumer. 
                                                 
76 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428, 435 
(Nield J); Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004, 1035 (Stuart-
Smith LJ). 
77 ABC v St George’s [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB). 
78 See Mulheron R. “Medical Negligence: Non-Patient and Third Party Claims” (2010, 
Routledge) for a comprehensive analysis of third party liability in the medical context.  See also 
Michael Fay, ‘Negligence, genetics and families; a duty to disclose actionable risks’ (2016) 16 
(3-2) Medical Law International 115-142 for an analysis in the context of disclosure in the case 
of genetic information, based on ABC. 
79 Such a principle was upheld in the case of Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M&W 109: “By 
permitting this action, we should be working this injustice, that after the defendant had done 
everything to the satisfaction of his employer, and after all matters between them had been 
adjusted, and all accounts settled on the footing of their contract, we should subject them to be 
ripped open by this action of tort being brought against him.” At 115 (Lord Abinger CB).  This 
was approved by Lord Tomlin in his dissenting judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 
562. 
80 [1932] AC 562. 
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Duties to third parties collateral to duties to primary parties exist in many other areas 
of negligence: there is a general duty on all of us not only not to injure our 
‘neighbours’81 – those who are foreseeably affected by our acts –  but also not to cause 
psychiatric harm to those bearing a close tie of love and affection to our neighbours.82  
This applies in all contexts where physical injury is caused by negligence, including the 
medical context.83 
 
Also in a medical context, it has been found that a HCP can owe a duty not to cause 
economic loss to a third party: in wrongful birth cases, damages have been awarded to 
both parents,84 despite there being no doctor-patient relationship between the HCP and 
the father.   
 
Third party duties have also been held to exist in cases of economic loss: where a person 
owes a duty to one party, there are circumstances in which there will also be a duty to 
a third party who foreseeably suffers loss as a result of a breach of the duty to the first 
party.  Perhaps the clearest example of this is the case of White v Jones:85 in this case, 
                                                 
81 [1932] AC 562, 580 (Lord Atkin). 
82 McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1992] 1 AC 310. 
83 Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1792; Farrell v Avon Health 
Authority [2001] All ER (D) 17 (Jul). 
84 Rand v East Dorset Health Authority (2000) 56 BMLR 39; McLelland v Greater Glasgow 
HA 2001 Scot (D) 5/3; Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2010] 1 WLR 2139; [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1203. See also Hibbert Pownall & Newton v Whitehead [2008] EWCA Civ 285, in 
which the father of a disabled child brought a claim in professional negligence against solicitors 
acting for the mother’s estate, for failing to advise him that he might have a claim in his own 
right.  The Court of Appeal appears to have accepted that, although the solicitors did not owe 
the father a duty as a third party, the doctors managing the pregnancy did. 
85 [1995] 2 AC 207.  
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solicitors negligently delayed attendance upon a client who had instructed them to 
redraft his will.  Before the client was able to execute the new will, he died, with the 
results that the intended beneficiaries under the new will received no legacies.  In the 
claim against the solicitors, the House of Lords held, 3-2, that the solicitors did owe a 
duty of care to the intended beneficiaries.  This was based on the assumption of 
responsibility doctrine established in Hedley Byrne v Heller.86  Two other cases87 also 
found that professionals owed a duty of care to third parties foreseeably affected by 
their negligence.  
 
The White case significantly extended the reach of the assumption of responsibility 
approach to economic loss established in Hedley Byrne.  Unlike Hedley Byrne and other 
cases in which a duty to a third party was found on the basis of assumption of 
responsibility, the claimants did not know that the defendants had been instructed, and 
therefore could not be relying on them to carry out their duty to the primary party: 
“[w]hat is important is not that A knows that B is consciously relying on A, but A knows 
that B's economic wellbeing is dependent upon A's careful conduct of B's affairs.”88 
 
The principle in White has been described by Witting89 as the ‘extended Hedley Byrne’ 
principle.90  The relevant elements of this principle have been set out as: 
                                                 
86 [1964] A.C. 465. 
87 Smith v Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 and Gorham v British Telecommunications plc [2000] 
1 WLR 2129. 
88 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, 272 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
89 Witting C. “Duty of care: an analytical approach” (2005) 25(1) OJLS 33-63. 
90 The same term (‘Extended Hedley Byrne principle) has also been used judicially to describe 
the extension of Hedley Byrne to circumstances where the breach was caused other than by 
negligent statements: Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830, 834 (Lord 
Steyn). 
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‒ Comparative skill or expertise; 
‒ Actual knowledge; 
‒ Conscious decision to accept responsibility for primary91 party; 
‒ Tight causal connection.92 
 
Applying these principles, a duty of care to a third party will arise where a professional 
undertakes a duty to a primary party; that the defendant knows that breach will cause 
damage to a third party of the same type as the defendant is under a duty to prevent to 
the primary party; and there is no conflict between the interests of the primary and third 
parties.93  This, coupled with causal proximity, creates a duty of care.  
The relationship in White, between a professional and the third parties who are both 
proximate to his client and liable to suffer damage through the professional’s acts or 
omissions, applies directly to the relationship between the healthcare professional and 
those who are proximate to the patient.     
A similar principle was stated by the Court of Appeal in Watson v British Boxing Board 
of Control.94  Having found, on the basis of assumption of responsibility, that the 
                                                 
91 Emphasis added: the Hedley Byrne principle requires the defendant to assume responsibility 
for the primary party.  Under the ‘extended Hedley Byrne principle’, the duty to the third party 
arises without the defendant having consciously accepted responsibility for the third party. 
92 Witting C. “Duty of care: an analytical approach” (2005) 25(1) OJLS 33, 59-60. 
93 See McLeod v Crawford 2011 S.C.L.R. 133 – White v Jones failed on lack of fundamental 
community – widow had different interests; and Caliendo v Mishcon de Reya [2016] EWHC 
150 (Ch), [725]: the solicitors duty to a third party extended as far as the third party’s interests 
were aligned with the solicitors’ clients. 
94 [2001] QB 1134. 
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governing body of boxing owed duty of care to boxers, they went on to state a wider 
principle: 
 
These cases95 establish that, where A advises B as to action to be taken which 
will directly and foreseeably affect the safety or well-being of C, a situation of 
sufficient proximity exists to found a duty of care on the part of A towards C.96 
 
With this exception, the extended Hedley Byrne principle has been mainly applied to 
situations involving economic loss.  However, that is a consequence of the principle 
being applied in circumstances where the duty to the primary party is to avoid economic 
loss, rather than physical injury.  There is no reason that a duty for a HCP not to cause 
injury, by failing to warn, should not be founded on the same principle.  Indeed, as a 
general principle, courts should be more ready to find a duty of care where the damage 
caused is physical rather than economic.   
 
The contrasting approaches taken by the House of Lords in Marc Rich v Bishop Rock 
Marine97  and the Court of Appeal in Perrett v Collins98 illustrate this principle: in both, 
damage was caused to a third party by negligent inspection of the means of transport in 
                                                 
95 Clay v A J Crump & Sons Ltd [1964] 1 QB 533; Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine 
Co Ltd [1996] AC 211; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; Phelps v 
Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619; Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
255. 
96 [2001] QB 1134, [72] (Lord Phillips MR, giving the only judgment).  
97 [1996] 1 AC 211.  A marine surveyor negligently allowed a ship, which later sank, to retain 
its classification.  The House of Lords held that it would not be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to 
hold the defendant liable to the cargo owners. 
98 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 255.  An aircraft inspector negligently issued a certificate of 
airworthiness. The aircraft crashed, causing physical injury to the plaintiff, a passenger. See 
also Witting C. “Negligent Inspectors and Flying Machines” (2000) 59(3) CLJ 544-561. 
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question.  However, when it was argued that the Court of Appeal should apply the same 
approach to physical injury as to economic loss, Hobhouse LJ held: 
 
What the Second and Third Defendants seek to achieve in this case is to extend 
decisions upon “economic” loss to cases of personal injuries. It represents a 
fundamental attack upon the principle of tortious liability for negligent 
conduct which had caused foreseeable personal injury to others. That such 
a point should be considered to be even arguable shows how far some of the 
fundamental principles of the law of negligence have come to be eroded.99 
 
A similar approach was endorsed by Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise 
Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc,100 in which he held that: 
 
In the case of personal or physical injury, reasonable foreseeability of harm is 
usually enough, in accordance with the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson,101 
to generate a duty of care. In the case of economic loss, something more is 
needed.102 
 
Applying these principles to the doctor-patient relationship, it is clear that, in some 
circumstances, a HCP should owe a duty of care to third parties.  As an example, 
consider the case of a paediatrician who negligently fails to diagnose a child with a 
                                                 
99 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 255, 257-8 (Hobhouse LJ) (emphasis added). 
100 [2006] UKHL 28; [2007] 1 AC 181. 
101 [1932] AC 562. 
102 At [31]. 
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contagious disease, such as meningitis, and allows her to return home.103  The ill child 
then infects a sibling before dying of the condition. The sibling suffers permanent brain 
damage. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the paediatrician does owe a duty 
of care to the child’s mother and father.104   If the shock of seeing her child die causes 
the mother to suffer a psychiatric illness, the paediatrician would be liable in 
negligence.  It would clearly be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ for the paediatrician also to 
be liable to the sibling who contracted the disease and suffered personal injury. 
 
Third party claims against HCPs are rare.  In the case of West Bromwich Albion FC v 
El-Safty,105 an orthopaedic surgeon had advised reconstructive surgery on a players’ 
knee.  The surgery was unsuccessful and the player was not able to play football: as a 
result, the football club lost his services while remaining liable for his wages.  A claim 
by the footballer in negligence succeeded, with the surgeon admitting negligence.106   
However, the claim by the football club failed: the Court of Appeal held that the surgeon 
did not owe a duty not to cause financial loss to the footballer’s employers. 
 
As Rix LJ pointed out, unlike Gorham, there was no ‘fundamental community’ between 
the patient’s interests and his employer’s interests: the employee’s interest was 
financial, while the patient’s interest was medical.  The ‘fundamental community’ 
                                                 
103 In Evans v Mayor of Liverpool [1906] KB 160, it was argued that hospitals did have a duty 
to protect family members from premature discharge of contagious patients: The plaintiff failed 
because the doctors had not breached their duty, but it seems to have been accepted that there 
was a duty to the family members who might be infected if the patient was discharged 
prematurely. 
104 McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410, 422 (Lord Wilberforce); Alcock v Chief Constable 
of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310, 397 (Lord Keith). 
105 [2006] EWCA Civ 1299, 92 BMLR 179. 
106 Appleton v El Safty [2007] EWHC 631 (QB). 
35 
 
requirement seems to be that the damage to the third party is either the same or of the 
same type as the defendant was under a duty not to cause to the primary party.  In 
successful third party claims,107 the third party’s interests coincided with the primary 
party’s. 
 
In general, third parties cannot recover for economic loss caused by physical injury 
caused to the primary party:108 however, if there is a duty not to cause physical injury, 
as exists in the doctor-patient relationship, the fundamental community requirement 
will be met and the third party should be able to recover for physical injury. 
Duty as a Control Mechanism 
 
Duty of care is the preferred ‘control mechanism’ in negligence: by restricting the 
expansion of new duties of care, the courts have sought to control the proliferation of 
claims109 and to relieve defendants from indeterminate liability.    As noted by Lord 
Nicholls in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust:110 
 
                                                 
107 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207;  Smith v Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; Gorham v British 
Telecommunications plc [2000] 1 WLR 2129. 
108 Best v Samuel Fox [1952] AC 716; London Borough of Islington v University College 
Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 596; Burgess v Florence Nightingale Hospital for 
Gentlewomen [1955] 1 QB 349, 355 (Devlin J). 
109 The oft-cited ‘floodgates’. 
110 [2005] 2 AC 373; [2005] UKHL 23. 
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Abandonment of the concept of a duty of care in English law, unless replaced 
by a control mechanism which recognises this limitation, is unlikely to clarify 
the law. That control mechanism has yet to be identified.111 
 
One of the principal areas in which duty of care has been used as a control mechanism 
has been when determining the liability of public authorities for ‘pure omissions’, such 
as failure to prevent physical injury caused by a third party or external causes.  The 
courts have consistently held that there is no duty of care in those circumstances.  
Decided cases have included a failure of the police to arrest a serial murderer112 or 
persons who had threatened the claimant,113  failure of a local authority to warn a 
resident that his neighbour was likely to cause him harm,114 failure of a health authority 
to recognise that a patient under the care of a mental health team posed a danger to the 
public,115  and failure of the police to respond to a 999 call.116 
 
This restrictive approach is largely based on public policy arguments. 117 In addition, 
where the claimant is a member of the general public, there will be no proximity 
between defendant and claimant: in the leading House of Lords case of Hill v Chief 
                                                 
111 At [94].  See also White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455, [129] 
(Lord Hoffmann).  
112 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1989] AC 53.  
113 Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344; Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire 
Police [2009] AC 255, [2008] UKHL 50. 
114 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] AC 874, [2009] UKHL 11. 
115 Palmer v Tees Health Authority (1998) 45 BMLR 88. 
116 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2. 
117 For analyses of the policy bases underpinning the liability of public authorities in negligence, 
see, for example, Tofaris, S. & Steel S. “Negligence liability for omissions and the police” 
(2015) 75(1) CLJ 128-157; A. Robertson, “On the Function of the Law of Negligence” (2013) 
33 O.J.L.S. 31-57; Robertson A. “Policy-based reasoning in duty of care cases” (2013) 33(1) 
LS 119-140; Bailey S, Bowman M., 'Public Authority Negligence Revisited' (2000) 59 CLJ 85.  
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Constable of West Yorkshire Police,118 the principal reason given by Lord Keith119 for 
not finding the police liable for injury caused by their failure to arrest a serial murderer 
was the lack of proximity between the police force and a member of the general public.  
There was nothing to distinguish Jaqueline Hill from any other young woman who 
might become the murderer’s next victim.120  Similarly, in Palmer v Tees Health 
Authority,121 there was insufficient proximity between the claimant, as a member of the 
general public with a young daughter, and the health authority that had failed to prevent 
her daughter’s abduction and murder by treating or detaining the murderer. 
   
The main policy issues considered by the courts in the context of third party claims 
have been the proliferation of claims122 and indeterminate liability123 considerations: 
these apply to claims against individuals, such as accountants,124 as well as public 
authorities. In the specific cases of claims against public authorities, the court has also 
cited the undesirability of encouraging defensive practices by public authorities,125 the 
undesirability of second-guessing non-justiciable decisions, such as those relating to 
the allocation of public resources,126 and distracting public authorities from their 
                                                 
118 [1989] AC 53. 
119 With whom Lords Brandon, Oliver and Goff agreed. 
120 [1989] AC 53, 62 (Lord Keith). 
121 (1998) 45 BMLR 88. 
122 See, for example, Customs and Excise Commissioners [2007] 1 AC 181, [100] (Lord 
Mance); Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] A.C. 241, 280 (Lord Goff). 
123 Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 621 (Lord Bridge). 
124 Such as the defendant in Caparo v Dickman.  
125 [1989] AC 53, 63 (Lord Keith). 
126 X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 A.C. 633, 737-8 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson). 
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primary duties.127  In ABC, Nicol J made specific reference to policy arguments 
applicable to public authorities, including the defensive practice argument and to the 
potential conflict between the public interest and a duty of care owed to an individual128 
when considering whether a HCP could owe a duty of care to a 3rd party. 
 
In the healthcare context, however, public authorities may be liable for omissions.  In 
Kent v Griffiths,129 the London Ambulance Service was found liable for a failure to 
attend within the promised time. The Court of Appeal held that a duty of care arose 
when the call was taken and the defendant was liable for the damage caused by the 
failure of the ambulance to attend within a reasonable time.   
 
On very similar facts, however, the Supreme Court held in Michael130 that no duty of 
care arose when the 999 call was made and accepted by the police.   Kent was 
distinguished on the grounds that no promise to attend was made, so that there was no 
assumption of responsibility.131   However, the duty of care in Kent was not based on 
the promise to attend.   The duty of care arose from the ambulance’s place within the 
NHS, which provided services to individuals rather than to the public as a whole:132 as 
                                                 
127 Calveley and Others v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228, 1238 (Lord 
Bridge); Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 
1495, [30] (Lord Steyn). 
128 [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB), [26]. 
129 [2001] QB 36. 
130 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732. 
131 At [138] (Lord Toulson). 
132 See Nagel T. “Ruthlessness in Public Bodies” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979) ch 6 for an analysis of the different moral standards applicable to public 
bodies and private individuals and the application of this analysis in Mullender R. “Negligence, 
Public Bodies, and Ruthlessness”  (2009) 72(6) MLR 961–983 to claims in negligence against 
public authorities.  
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a result, the public policy argument against finding a duty of care was much weaker 
than when considering the police and fire services.133  Once the ambulance service had 
accepted the call, the duty of care arose, irrespective of any promises to attend.134  In 
Michael, had Kent been applied, the duty would have arisen when the call handler told 
the victim that the call would be passed onto the South Wales Police.135  
 
An Alternative Control Mechanism: breach of duty.  
In the context of clinical negligence, courts have used the ‘Bolam test’136 and the test 
set out in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board137 as control mechanisms which 
have kept litigation within proper bounds.  While Bolam remains the appropriate test 
for clinical negligence claims involving diagnosis or treatment, in Montgomery, the 
Supreme Court held that it should only be applied where the decision in question 
required solely medical expertise.138  In cases where the decision is non-medical, such 
as which of the risks inherent in a specific procedure should be disclosed, or whether 
genetic information should be disclosed, the Bolam test is displaced by a requirement 
that the doctor should take reasonable care, as determined by the court.139   This would 
be the appropriate test to apply when determining whether a HCP was negligent in not 
disclosing information to a 3rd party. 
                                                 
133 [2001] QB 36,  [45] (Lord Woolf, with whom Aldous LJ and Laws LJ agreed). 
134 At [49].  
135 See [9] of the judgment. 
136 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Bolitho v City & 
Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
137 [2015]  UKSC 1, [2015] AC 1430. 
138 [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430, [85] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reed JJSC, with whom the 
other Justices of the Supreme Court agreed). 
139 Ibid., [83]. 
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By placing the control mechanism at the breach, rather than at the duty stage, courts 
have been able to maintain a balance: protecting HCPs from indeterminate liability and 
not encouraging defensive medicine while at the same time recognising that “the rule 
of public policy which has first claim on the loyalty of the law” is that wrongs should 
be remedied.140 
 
The duty of care in the medical context 
 
In the medical context, the reasons to hold that there is no duty to a third party fall away: 
the public policy reasons do not apply with such force; and duty of care is not needed 
as a control mechanism. As a result, the arguments against finding that a HCP might 
owe a third party – such as a first order relative of the proband – a duty of care become 
correspondingly weaker.   
 
In the case of psychiatric injury caused by witnessing a traumatic event, the courts have 
developed a set of criteria, based on proximity and foreseeability and whether it is fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a duty,141 which limit the extent of the duty. 142  By 
analogy, the duty to disclose information could be similarly limited by the courts to, for 
example, first and second order relatives, or those living in the same household.  As has 
                                                 
140 M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council and X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County 
Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 663 (Sir Thomas Bingham MR). 
141 Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
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been recognised by the courts, such limits may be arbitrary, but are necessary to limit 
the scope of the tort and to protect defendants from indeterminate liability.143   
 
In this context, proximity would depend upon  the relationship – domestic or genetic – 
between the primary party and the third party.  So a HCP might owe a duty to warn of 
an infectious disease to the persons living with the patient, as primary party, but not to 
visitors to the household or members of the general public.  A HCP who negligently 
discharged a patient who was still infectious might owe a duty of care to that patient’s 
immediate family, but would not be liable for a general outbreak of the disease. 
Applying the concept of proximity to the case of genetic conditions, the HCP might 
owe a duty to first and second order relatives, but not to more distant relations.  This 
requirement would allay any fears of a HCP facing indeterminate liability as a result. 
 
To succeed, the claimant would still have to show that the HCP did not act reasonably.  
The existence of a duty of care does not mean that the HCP is liable for any harm 
caused: he will only be liable to the extent that his failure to act reasonably caused the 
injury.  So a HCP treating a genetic disorder would owe a duty to any relative with the 
necessary genetic proximity.  But to hold the HCP liable for any harm suffered, the 
relative would also have to show that he acted unreasonably.   As the Superior Court of 
New Jersey held in Safer v Pack, the duty is to ensure ‘that reasonable steps be taken 
                                                 
143 See, for example, comments by Lord Oliver in Alcock  at 417;  and by Lord Goff, dissenting, 
in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 A.C. 455, 488 
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to assure that the information reaches those likely to be affected or is made available 
for their benefit.’144 
 
Depending on the specific circumstances, a HCP might discharge his duty to any 
relative by appropriate advice to the patient: for example, advising the patient of the 
risk to relatives and referring him to genetic counselling.  If the HCP was aware that 
the patient was unwilling to pass on the information, then they might be under a duty 
to pass on the information, with the consequential breach of the patient’s 
confidentiality, to any third parties with sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of 
care. 
Imposing such duties would not, as was suggested by counsel for the defendant in 
ABC,145 place HCPs in a difficult position; or at least no more than their existing 
professional obligations do. 
 
Drawing together the duty of confidence and the duty to warn 
 
These two duties are the corollary of each other; in practice, questions about whether 
to disclose information to family members of a proband raise the issue of both the duty 
of confidence, and duty of care to third parties. But although the facts will be the same, 
the legal tests are separated, and approached differently depending on whether they are 
                                                 
144 (1996) 291 N.J.Sup. 619, 677 A. 2d 1188, 1192.  This passage was quoted, with approval, 
by the Court of Appeal in ABC v St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 336, 
[59] (Irwin LJ). 
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analysed from the point of view of the proband (duty of confidence) or that of the family 
member (duty to warn). Thus, the HCP at the heart of the matter will be faced with two 
potentially conflicting duties. It would be problematic if the application of the two legal 
tests led to conflicting outcomes. 
 
At present, an analysis of the duty of confidence may result in a conclusion that 
disclosure to third parties is in the public interest. Unless there is at least a limited duty 
to warn in certain circumstances, as outlined above, a risk averse HCP would be well 
advised to maintain confidentiality, as there will be no party with standing to sue for 
breach of duty to warn, but there will be a party with a potential cause of action for 
breach of confidence. Such a position will, it is submitted, skew practice too far in 
favour of confidentiality.   
 
If the balance of the law is as argued above, then the outcomes of the application of the 
tests of duty of confidence and the duty of care will be consistent, as well as congruent 
with ethical obligations. In determining whether disclosure is either authorised (duty of 
confidence) or required (duty of care) we suggest that ultimately, the HCP (or court) 
will be required to balance the competing rights of the parties, and that the central 
question that will be key in these cases is that of the harm that will result to the third 
party concerned. 
 
Although there are conceptual differences between these tests, the relevant factors 
which will feed into the analysis are likely to be the seriousness of the genetic condition 
in question, its treatability and the chance that the relative in question might inherit the 
condition. A HCP will need to consider each factual situation on its merits. The question 
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of the threshold of seriousness and treatability is the subject of significant debate in the 
genetics community,146 and HCPs will be able to draw on a body of professional 
opinion,147 which will no doubt also serve to inform a court. 
 
Serious, treatable conditions will have greater impetus for disclosure than less serious, 
or untreatable conditions. For example, a case of sudden cardiac death, with a clear 
genetic contribution, serious outcome and treatment in the form of medication or 
implantable defibrillator which allows the harm to be averted provides a good example 
where the balance is likely to be struck in favour of sharing.148 Conversely, a condition 
with unclear genetic inheritance or low penetrance, with variable severity and late onset 
is likely to be one where the balance is struck in favour of maintaining confidence. 
 
There will, however, be situations where the balancing exercise is more complex. We 
suggest that the cases most likely to be difficult to resolve will revolve around questions 
of whether there is legally actionable harm. An example is where there is a serious 
condition, but where at present there is no known treatment to modify disease course. 
Whether the law will recognise the personal utility that a party may attach to the mere 
possession of information, in the absence of any ‘use’ in the medical sense is 
questionable. It must also be balanced against the harm that could result from forcing 
                                                 
146 See for example S Kalia et al, ‘Recommendations for reporting of secondary findings in 
clinical exome and genome sequencing, 2016 update (ACMG SF v2.0): a policy statement of 
the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics’ (2016) Genetics in Medicine 
(advance online publication doi:10.1038/gim.2016.190) 
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information on a person against their wish to know – a violation of the ethical principle 
of the ‘right not to know’.149 
 
Additionally, it is unclear whether the law would recognise harm in the loss of chance 
relating to reproductive autonomy. Prenatal testing, preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
or prenatal testing are all available to those who are aware they are carrying genetic 
mutations. However, whether the law would recognise a loss of chance in relation to 
these opportunities seems doubtful. 
 
Arguments in favour of a more expansive view of harm seem more likely to be 
successful in the context of the duty of confidence, particularly by reference to a human 
rights analysis. Therefore, a HCP who chooses to disclose to a third party to avert harm 
of this nature may avoid liability. However, a third party who wishes to claim against a 
HCP for breach of a duty of care for failure to disclose will be unlikely to succeed due 
to the law of negligence’s more restricted view of harm. It is our contention that this 
distinction in recovery reflects an appropriate balance – it provides freedom to a HCP 
who feels an ethical obligation to disclose, but does not impose liability for failure to 
disclosure.  
 
Applying the test outlined above in the cases of ABC v St George’s and Smith v 
Leicester is instructive. We suggest that in neither case would the duty of care we 
propose be found to be breached. In ABC, had the HCPs wished to breach their duty of 
confidence, they could have argued that disclosure was in the public interest, although 
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the fact that there is no known treatment for Huntington’s disease, and that it is known 
that relatively few people undertake predictive genetic testing would have made that 
argument finely balanced. However, in the case of the duty of care, it is submitted that, 
whilst a duty should be owed, that in this case there would be no breach of the standard 
of care by maintenance of confidence. This is due primarily to the fact that there is no 
available treatment for this adult onset condition.  
 
It seems likely that the outcome of Smith would also be unchanged.  While it would be 
for the court to determine whether there was sufficient proximity, in the form of the 
genetic relationship between the patient and the third party, for there to be a duty, the 
claimant was the second cousin of the patient in question.  This is a 5th order genetic 
relationship, with only 3% of genetic material shared between the parties.  It is likely 
that the court would find insufficient proximity between the parties for there to be a 
duty of care. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ultimate analysis in genetic information sharing cases will in essence relate to the 
nature of the harm which arises due to the failure to disclose. The concept of harm is 
likely to be problematic in many cases, as the type of harm arising may not be 
recognised in law. However, this failure of the law to recognise some types of harm 
arising in genetic information sharing is appropriate. The ethical judgements in these 
cases are not clear cut, and reasonable HCPs, and lawyers, may disagree as to the 
appropriate outcome. In the absence of clear ethical consensus, it seems appropriate 
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that the law should not mandate disclosure. The appropriate outcome is that only in 
fairly rare cases should there be a duty to disclose, and in a slightly wider series of cases 
will disclosure be authorised. 
 
As was noted in Montgomery, “[u]nder the stimulus of the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
courts have become increasingly conscious of the extent to which the common law 
reflects fundamental values.”150 These fundamental values underpin the medical 
profession’s ethical principles and it is desirable that legal obligation reinforce, rather 
than conflict with, professional obligations.151  Most HCPs working in clinical genetics 
regard informing those who might be directly affected by their patients’ genetic 
information as something that a reasonable HCP should do, and there is a significant 
body of medical literature examining the circumstances in which disclosure is ethically 
desirable.152  In some circumstances, where disclosing the genetic information would 
allow the relative to receive earlier treatment, they might regard that as outweighing 
their duty of confidentiality to their patient.   A HCP who does disclosure information 
to a family member in the face of opposition from their patient runs the risk of being 
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liable for breach of confidence. To counterbalance this risk, it is our contention that, in 
limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise. This would make the law congruent 
with the GMC Guidance on Confidentiality in relation to disclosure of genetic 
information to family members, as well as the reported experience of many HCPs 
working in clinical genetics. It is our contention that this is an additional factor in favour 
of the rebalancing of the law we propose. 
 
The familial nature of genetic information strains the individualistic approach of the 
law in relation to confidentiality and tort. However, the law is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate scientific and medical realities. The law of confidence permits the 
disclosure of information in the public interest, and the flexibilities of the way in which 
public interest is interpreted permit disclosure in limited and appropriate circumstances. 
More controversially, we argue that, in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care 
should be owed by a HCP to third party family members. We contend that it is more 
suitable in this case for the limits on liability to arise at the stage of breach, rather than 
the duty of care imposition. 
 
